Contest success functions |
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Authors: | Stergios Skaperdas |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of California, 92717 Irvine, CA, USA |
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Abstract: | Summary Tournaments, conflict, and rent-seeking have been modelled as contests in which participants exert effort to increase their probability of winning a prize. A Contest Success Function (CSF) provides each player's probability of winning as a function of all players' efforts. In this paper the additive CSF employed in most contests is axiomatized, with an independence from irrelevant alternatives property as the key axiom. Two frequently used functional forms are also axiomatized: one in which winning probabilities depend on the ratio of players' efforts and the other in which winning probabilities depend on the difference in efforts.I am grateful to three anonymous referees, Jack Hirshleifer, Guillermo Owen, and especially Duncan Luce for their helpful comments, and to the UC Irvine Academic Senate and the NSF for financial support. |
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Keywords: | C70 D72 D74 |
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