Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance |
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Authors: | Laeven Luc |
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Affiliation: | Luc Laeven is with the World Bank, Financial Sector Department, Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Unit. His e-mail address is llaeven{at}worldbank.org. |
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Abstract: | ![]() Arguing that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicatesthat a bank takes excessive risks, this article estimates thecost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14economies to assess the relationship between the risk-takingbehavior of banks and their corporate governance structure.The results suggest that banks with concentrated ownership tendto take the greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownershipengage in a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, asa proxy for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has somepower in predicting bank distress. |
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