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国际碳交易的显示偏好博弈分析
引用本文:纪明. 国际碳交易的显示偏好博弈分析[J]. 工业技术经济, 2012, 0(6): 87-93
作者姓名:纪明
作者单位:吉林大学,长春,130012
摘    要:随着全球性的气候变化危机日益严重,国际碳交易成为抑制全球气候变暖的有效途径,它是利用市场机制引领低碳经济发展的必由之路。虽然国际碳交易市场蕴藏着巨大的经济利益,但是国际碳交易机制还没有完善。完美的国际碳交易机制应该是一种显示偏好博弈的过程,只有在国际碳市场中,每个博弈参与者都真实的反应自己的信息与偏好,最后的显示偏好博弈纳什均衡结果才能是帕累托有效、公平的。在国际节能减排事业中,我国应该积极的参与到国际碳交易的显示偏好博弈中,促使国际碳交易市场做到有效、公平、抗操纵且满足于个体理性,为完善国际碳交易机制做出更大的贡献。

关 键 词:国际碳交易  显示偏好博弈  帕累托最优

Revealing Preference Game Analysis on the International Carbon Emissions Trading
Ji Ming. Revealing Preference Game Analysis on the International Carbon Emissions Trading[J]. Industrial Technology & Economy, 2012, 0(6): 87-93
Authors:Ji Ming
Affiliation:Ji Ming(Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China)
Abstract:With the increasing risk happening to the environmental resources of the global system and more and more serious problems of global warming,international carbon emissions trading will be an effective way to inhibit global warming.Although international carbon emissions market will bring us big profits in future,the mechanism has not been established perfectly.The mechanism of international carbon emissions trading should be a process of revealing preference game,only all the players show their information and preferences truly,can the equilibrium outcome be unique and Pareto efficient.China should participate in the international carbon emissions trading more actively,promting the efficiency,justice and rationality in the carbon emissions market,and play a more important role in the international carbon emissions trading.
Keywords:international carbon emissions trading  revealing preference game  pareto optimality
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