Strategic trade policy with bargaining over managerial contracts |
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Authors: | Luciano Fanti Domenico Buccella |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy;2. Department of Economics, Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland |
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Abstract: | This paper re‐examines the well‐known activist regime's inefficiency (governments set export subsidies) in a sales–delegation game with owner–manager bargaining over contracts. Contrary to the received literature, this bargaining process may (a) induce governments to set a tax if products are not too substitute or complements and (b) lead to an efficient (inefficient) equilibrium provided that products are sufficiently differentiated (not too complements). Therefore, unilateral public intervention can be optimal: in case of rival governments' retaliation, under appropriate product competition degrees, welfares are larger than under free trade even for small managers' power. Thus, managerial delegation practices are crucial also for international trade issues. |
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