控制权的分割与整合——国有产权“五龙治水”体制变迁效率的博弈分析

本文通过一个两阶段的动态谈判博弈模型证明了集中统一行使国家所有权是有利于提高国有企业的效率的。本文将国有企业的控制权看作是一种可以交易的产权,企业的管理者会通过向掌握企业控制权的政府官员提供利益来“购买”企业控制权,从而形成一种国有企业控制权市场。由于这种企业控制权的交易是卖方垄断的,因此不存在竞争性的交易价格。官员可以索取一个垄断价格。当各个部门利益独立时,他们都有动机提高价格。这时,企业管理者为了得到完整的控制权,就必须付出更高的代价。这就使得企业管理者努力工作的激励下降,从而影响了企业的经营绩效。这是控制权分割会使企业效率降低的根本原因。

Integrating the Separated Control Rights: An Analysis of the Change of the State-Owned Asset Administration System

In this paper we build a two-stage game model to show that the integration of control rights will improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises.We consider the control rights of state-owned enterprises as transferable property rights.The managers of state-owned enterprises will "purchase" the control rights from the officials by providing them with some kind of benefits.This kind of transactions leads to a monopoly market of control rights since the officials hold the control rights exclusively.When the control rights are separated among more than one official,these complementary control rights will be sold by independent monopolists.The manager will have to pay more to purchase all kinds of control rights.This will result in the withdrawal of effort by the manager and in turn will worsen the performance of state-owned enterprises.That is why we hold that the separation of control rights leads to the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises.