基于信息不对称的损失厌恶供应链博弈研究

考虑制造商不知道零售商的损失厌恶信息,基于Stackelberg博弈方法,研究损失厌恶信息不对称对企业决策、企业之间的博弈关系、企业与供应链绩效的影响。算例结果表明,如果制造商高估零售商的损失厌恶程度,导致制造商的批发价格下降、零售商的订货量增加,对零售商有利,但对制造商不利;反之,如果制造商低估零售商的损失厌恶程度,导致制造商的批发价格增加、零售商的订货量下降,对制造商与零售商都不利。所以,零售商希望制造商高估零售商的损失厌恶程度,而制造商希望准确估计零售商的损失厌恶程度,该结论符合人们的直觉判断。

Research on Games of Loss-averse Supply Chain Based on Asymmetric Information

This paper studies influence on enterprise's decision-making,game relationships between enterprises,enterprise and supply chain's performance by asymmetric loss-averse information based on Stackelberg game models,when manufacturer doesn't know retailer's loss-averse information.The results show that wholesale price decreases and quantity increases if manufacturer overestimates retailer's lossaversion degree,which brings advantage to retailer,but brings disadvantage to manufacturer;otherwise,wholesale price increases and quantity decreases when manufacturer underestimates retailer's loss-aversion degree,which brings disadvantage to retailer and manufacturer;so retailer hopes manufacturer to overestimate retailer's loss-aversion degree,manufacturer hopes to estimate accurately retailer's loss-aversion degree,which conforms to people's intuitional judge.