A note on public debt, tax-exempt bonds, and Ponzi games |
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Authors: | Berthold U. Wigger |
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Affiliation: | aUniversity of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Department of Economics, Lange Gasse 20, 90403 Nuremberg, Germany |
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Abstract: | By issuing tax-exempt bonds, the government can incur debt and never pay back any principal or interest, even if the economy without public debt evolves on a dynamically efficient growth path. The welfare effects of such a Ponzi type borrowing scheme are mixed. The current young will unambiguously benefit. Depending on preferences and the aggregate technology, a finite number of subsequent generations may also benefit. However, the welfare of all generations thereafter will be lower than in the economy without public debt. |
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Keywords: | Public debt Tax-exempt bonds Capital taxation Ponzi game |
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