Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Heidelberg, Germany;2. University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands;1. ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Spain;2. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Spain;3. University of Michigan, United States;1. Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom;2. Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan;3. WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Germany;4. Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany;1. Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3S, United Kingdom;3. Department of Economics, Columbia University, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, USA;4. Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 549 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880, USA;1. eBay Data Labs, United States;2. Harvard University, United States;3. Harvard Business School, United States |
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| Abstract: | I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for any network, a folk theorem holds if some Joint Pairwise Identifiability condition regarding payoff functions is satisfied. Second, a necessary and sufficient condition on the network topology for a folk theorem to hold for all payoff functions is that no two players have the same set of neighbors not counting each other. |
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| Keywords: | Communication Folk theorem Imperfect private monitoring Networks Repeated games |
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