Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions |
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| Institution: | 1. RWTH Aachen University, School of Business and Economics, Templergraben 64, 52062 Aachen, Germany;2. University of Cologne, Department of Management, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany;3. University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany;1. Coordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China;2. Beijing Institute of Satellite Information Engineering, Beijing 100086, China |
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| Abstract: | This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit. |
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| Keywords: | Linear public goods game Sanction Punishment institutions Laboratory experiment |
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