Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom;2. Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan;3. WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Germany;4. Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany;1. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark;2. Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain;3. CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium;4. Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark;1. Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University, India;2. School of Management and Governance, Murdoch University, Australia |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies a two-dimensional cheap talk game with two senders and one receiver. The senders possess the same information and sequentially send messages about that information. In one-dimensional sequential message cheap talk games where the state space is unbounded, the information is fully transmitted under the self-serving belief, as suggested by Krishna and Morgan (2001b). However, this result depends crucially on the structure of the one-dimensional model. It generally does not hold in two-dimensional models. We consider the extended self-serving belief, which implies full information transmission even if the self-serving belief cannot work. Then, we show that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the fully revealing equilibrium is that the senders have opposing-biased preferences. |
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| Keywords: | Multidimensional cheap talk Multi-senders Sequential communication Fully revealing equilibrium |
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