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Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
Institution:1. Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe-Madrid, Spain;2. Centro de Economía Aplicada, Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile, Avenida Republica 701, Santiago, Chile;1. University of Heidelberg, Germany;2. University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands;1. University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Albertus-Magnus Platz, D-50923 Cologne, Germany;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom;1. ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Spain;2. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Spain;3. University of Michigan, United States;1. Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3S, United Kingdom;3. Department of Economics, Columbia University, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, USA;4. Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 549 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880, USA
Abstract:In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a symmetric mechanism where colleges and students interchange their roles. This mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings.
Keywords:Sequential mechanisms  Stable outcomes  Multiple applications  Irreversibility
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