基于套牢的开发商与承包商博弈分析

通过引入不可证实性系数,分析了开发商与承包商的博弈过程,并且得出结论:当市场状况良好时,即使承包商采取套牢行为,开发商仍将投资房地产；如果开发商的可占用准租不足以支付承包商所侵占的利益,开发商将可能不再投资房地产.其中,事项的不可证实性使承包商有机会侵占开发商的利益,因此,减少事项的不可证实性可以最大化开发商的收益.垫资合同在很大程度上可以减轻承包商的套牢程度.但无论如何,合同的不完全性都难以解决,套牢是不可避免的存在的,但是只要开发商能够从中获取超额收益,其投资行为就是必然的.

Game Analysis based on Hold-up Theory with Developer and Builder

The article anglicized game theory in pperformances of the contract between developer and contractor,and concluded that: developer would choose investment in real estate although its appropriable quasi-rents having occupied by contractor for a large number of appropriable quasi-rents coming from Specific investments,but when Real Estate Market was so bad not to pay for benefit occupied by contractor,developer would not invest in real estate.Contractor get benefit from what can not be confirmed,so developer can raise himself benefit if he can reduce the not-verifiable extend.Contractor′s loaning resolves the hold-up problem to some extent.Contract was always not complete,and Hold-up was inevitable.Only obtaining excess return,developer will invest in real estate.