股权结构、内部现金流和企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的检验

中国上市公司控制权和现金流权的高度分离为我们提供了一个很好的研究投资现金流敏感性的样本.本文从终极控制人的视角,以我国2003-2007年上市公司为研究对象,研究了终极控制股东现金流权及控制权与现金流权的偏离对企业过度投资的影响.研究表明:企业的投资现金流敏感度随着终极控股股东现金流权的增加而趋于下降;伴随控制权与现金流权分离水平的增加而上升.这种结果和自由现金流假说一致,即控股股东拥有过多的自由现金流可能导致过度投资,并且这种过度投资问题在资产收益率低的公司里更加严重.我们的结果不仅解决了以往关于现金流和投资之间的敏感是由于控股股东偏好过度投资还是投资不足的争论,而且为控股股东存在“激励效应”和“堑壕效应”提供了直接证据

Ownership Structure,Cash Flow and Capital Investment——Of the Free Cash Flow and Information Department Symmetrical Theory Test

Control and the height of the cash flow right separation offers us a very good samples of research investment cash flow sensitivity China’s listed companies.Using 2004-2007 of financial and ownership data in china,we document that while the sensitivity of a firm’s capital investment to its cash flow decreases as the cash-flow rights of its largest shareholders increase,this sensitivity increases as the degree of the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the firm’s largest shareholders increases.We interpret the results to be consistent with the free cash-flow hypothesis,which postulates that too much free cash flow in the hands of entrenched largest shareholders is likely to lead to overinvestment,and this excessive investment is more serious in the return on assets low company.Our results not only solved debate about the sensitive of cash flow and investment due to controlling shareholders preference excess investment or lack of investment,and provide direct evidence for controlling shareholder existence "incentive effect"and "Occupy effect".