公司创业投资与企业控制权配置： 基于技术契合视角

控制权配置是创业企业治理的核心问题，公司创业投资母公司与被投资企业间的技术契合水平是影响创业企业控制权配置的重要因素。基于不完全契约理论，文章构建公司创业投资者与企业家不同控制权收益影响下创业企业控制权配置数理模型，分析技术契合水平对创业企业两类控制权配置的作用机理，并提出研究假设。文章运用公司创业投资支持的97 家上市企业3 年非 平衡面板数据，通过随机效应模型检验我国公司创业投资母公司与被投资企业间技术契合水平对创业企业两类控制权配置的影响。结果表明，当公司创业投资者战略收益较小、创业企业家私人收益较大时，双方技术契合度与公司创业投资者获得的剩余控制权呈非线性倒U 型关系；当公司创业投资者战略收益较大，创业企业家私人收益较小时，双方技术契合度与公司创业投资者获得的剩余控制权呈非线性U 型关系；公司创业投资者获得的特定控制权与双方技术契合度正相关。

Corporate Venture Capital and Enterprise Control Right Allocation: Based on the Perspective of Technology Fit

Control right allocation is the key problem of the governance of entrepreneurial firms, and the level of technology fit between the parent company of CVC and the invested company is an important factor affecting the allocation of control rights of entrepreneurial firms. Based on the GHM theory, this paper builds mathematical model under different control benefits effect of CVC and entrepreneurs, proposes research hypothesis. By using the unbalanced panel data from 97 CVC-backed firms for 3 years, this paper examines the impact of technology fit on two types of control rights of entrepreneurial firms by random effects model. We find that when CVCs strategic benefits remain low, entrepreneurs private benefits keep high , there is an nonlinear inverted U-relationship between technology fit and residual control right; when CVCs strategic benefits keep high, entrepreneurs private benefits remain low, there is an non-linear U-relationship between technology fit and residual control right. Also, the technology fit between the parent company of CVC and the invested company is positively correlated with the specific control right obtained by CVC.