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CFOs versus CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes
Authors:Jeong-Bon Kim  Yinghua Li
Affiliation:a Department of Accountancy, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong
b Baruch College, The City University of New York, One Bernard Baruch Way, New York, NY 10010-5585, USA
Abstract:Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage.
Keywords:D89   G12   G17   G34   M52
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