Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices |
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| Authors: | Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans Charles M. Kahn |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, Urbana, Champaign, IL 61820, USA, US;(2) Department of Finance, University of Illinois, Urbana, Champaign, IL 61820, USA, US |
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| Abstract: | Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction. Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997 |
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| Keywords: | JEL Classification Numbers: D44 D82 C72. |
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