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Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power |
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| Institution: | 1. ITAM, Mexico;2. Princeton University, USA;1. Département des Sciences Économiques, ESG-UQAM, Montréal, Canada;2. CESifo, Germany;3. CORE, Belgium;4. Universidad de los Andes, School of Government, Colombia;5. CORE, Université de Louvain, Belgium;6. CREPP, Université de Liège, Belgium;7. Toulouse School of Economics, France |
| Abstract: | We consider a two-player Tullock rent-seeking contest with uncertain discriminatory power in the contest success function. We examine the cases where both players are either informed or uninformed about the size of the discriminatory power, as well as the case where only one player has private information about it. We show that in all three cases the contest has a unique (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. In each case we characterize key properties of the equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Rent-seeking contest Discriminatory power Private information D7 |
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