国有银行战略引资后的控股权研究——社会性负担对国有银行控股比例的影响及解决

国有银行战略引资后的国有股比重应该怎样选择呢?本文通过引入我国银行业的古诺竞争均衡模型,发现国有银行的社会性负担影响着国有银行的产出、成本、目标函数以及国有银行与其他类型银行的边际替代率,并通过国有银行的利润与社会总福利相关联,通过国有银行的总收益影响着政府政策目标函数,并集中体现为对国有银行中国有股份比重选择的影响.当国有股份的比重取0或1两个端点值都无法使得社会总福利和政府目标函数达到最大均衡值,最优的国有股份比重应来自于(0,1)的区间解.同时,模型还发现:随着国有银行中国有股份比重越大,国有银行经营决策受政府政策目标影响的程度也就越高,因而所承受的社会性负担也就越重.因此,为降低社会性负担对国有银行的负面影响并最终解决国有银行的控股权问题,我们只能通过提高国有银行的经营效率与效益.

Research on Share Control Right of State-owned Banks Following Strategic Investors Import

Authorities have emphasized the control right of state-owned banks after importing strategic investors. However, what is the optimum share percentage? This paper finds that the social burden has influenced the output, cost, target function of state-owned banks, especially the choice of state-holding shares. We conclude that when state-holding weight becomes zero or one, the social welfare and stat target function cannot be maximized. The optimum state-holding weight should be in the range from zero to one. In addition, the bigger the state-holding weight, the heavier the social burden for state-owned bank. As a solution, we should promote the efficieny and profitability of state-owned banks.