高管激励对企业创新影响的实证分析——基于分析师关注的中介效应研究

基于2011-2018年A股上市公司的面板数据,采用中介效应模型和Bootstrap检验,实证分析了高管激励、分析师关注和企业创新三者之间的关系.结果 表明:薪酬激励、股权激励都可以促进企业创新,高管激励力度越大,企业的创新投入和创新产出越多;高管激励与分析师关注呈正相关关系,不论是薪酬激励还是股权激励,都会提高分析师对企业的关注程度;分析师关注在高管激励与企业创新关系中发挥了重要中介作用,高管激励通过提高分析师关注进而促进了企业创新,在控制了高管激励因素后,分析师关注对企业创新仍然存在明显正效应.

The Impact of Executive Incentive on Corporate Innovation: A Mediating Effect Study Based on Analyst Attention

Based on the panel data of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2018, this paper empirically explores the relationship among executive incentive, analyst attention, and corporate innovation through the mediation effect model and Bootstrap test. It is found that both salary incentive and equity incentive can promote corporate innovation. The greater the incentive for executives, the more innovation input and output the company has. There is a positive correlation between executive incentive and analyst attention, both compensation incentive and equity incentive will increase analyst attention. Analyst attention has played an important intermediary role in the relationship between executive incentive and corporate innovation. Executive incentive promotes corporate innovation by increasing analyst attention. After controlling the executive incentive factor, the analyst attention still has a significant positive effect on corporate innovation.