| 约束导游人员道德风险的博弈模型分析及改进 |
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| 引用本文： | 王静.约束导游人员道德风险的博弈模型分析及改进[J].长春金融高等专科学校学报,2010(1):35-37. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王静 |
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| 作者单位： | 西北师范大学,经济管理学院,甘肃,兰州,730070 |
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| 摘 要： | 导游人员为谋求自身利益最大化而产生的道德风险行为使旅行社和游客的利益均受到损害,对旅行社业乃至整个旅游业的发展产生了不利的影响。为了阐明其产生的原因,模型在博弈论的基础上对导游人员的道德风险行为进行分析。旅行社和游客的监督作用是降低导游人员道德风险行为的有效方法。
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| 关 键 词： | 道德风险行为 博弈 导游人员 利益 |
Analysis and Improvement on the Game Model Controlling Tour Guides' Moral Risk |
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| WANG Jing.Analysis and Improvement on the Game Model Controlling Tour Guides' Moral Risk[J].Journal of Changchun Finance College,2010(1):35-37. |
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| Authors: | WANG Jing |
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| Institution: | Department of Mathematics;Normal College of Gansu Union University;Lanzhou 730000;China |
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| Abstract: | The moral risk behavior produced by tour guides' seeking interests maximum has damaged the interests of travel agents and tourists,and has had very bad effect on the business of travel agents and even the whole traveling.In order to make clear the reasons,model analyzes tour guides' moral risk on the basis of game model.The supervision function of travel agents and tourists is the effective method to reduce tour guides' moral risk. |
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| Keywords: | moral risk behavior game tour guide benefits |
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