供应链中甄别契约设计与信息共享激励

针对供应链中上下游企业的委托-代理问题,委托人可以设计出某种甄别契约以区分不同类型的代理人在不同的市场需求状况下的努力程度。在完全信息的条件下,委托人采取固定佣金方案及承担全部风险为最优选择。在信息不完全的条件下,若代理人为风险规避者则委托人只承担部分销售风险但需付出额外的风险补偿成本,若代理人为风险中性者则委托人不需付出额外的风险补偿成本。

Screening Contract Design and Information Sharing Incentive in the Supply Chain

As in the background of principal - agent problem of members in a supply chain,the principal can design some screening contracts to distinguish endeavor extent from different kinds of agents under the condition of different market demand. The paper shows that under the condition of complete information,the principal′s best choice is to bear all the risks and give the agent fixed commission. Under the condition of asymmetric information,the principal only needs bear part of the risks but pays extra risks compensatory cost if the agent is risk aversion,however,the principal doesn′t need to pay extra risk compensatory cost if the agent is risk neutral.