我国商业银行操作风险管理刍议——基于成本一收益权衡的经济学解读

操作风险的幽灵像噩梦一样困扰着我国商业银行。传统的操作风险管理体系在应对严重违规操作案件频出的操作风险困局方面捉襟见肘，当前的严峻形势要求我们开拓思路，从崭新的视角出发来审视操作风险。本文从成本一收益分析的经济学视角出发，通过经济模型的构建和解读得出如下结论：科学的操作风险管理体系不仅包括传统的外部防控制度，还应该包括对员工的内部激励制度，其中，前者通过威慑潜在违规者使其不敢违规，后者则通过激励潜在违规者以使其自愿合规。因此，要想从根本上解决操作风险之患，必须坚持两手抓，两手都要硬，从而构建一个监督共激励一体、震慑违规与温暖人心齐备的以人为本的操作风险管理体系。

On Management of Operational Risk in China's Commercial Banks——Economic Interpretation Based on Cost-benefit Balance

The ghost of operational risk, like a nightmare, troubles commercial banks in China. As the traditional operational risk management system is powerless in coping with frequent and severe cases violating rules and regulations, the grim reality requires us to explore new ideas and re-examine operational risk from a new perspective. Based on cost- benefit analysis in economics, the paper draws the following conclusion by constructing and interpreting economic model ： scientific operational risk management system should include the traditional external prevention and control system and the internal incentive system for employees, in which the former deters potential violators from violating rules and regulations while the latter gives potential violators an incentive to comply with rules and regulations voluntarily. Therefore, in order to eliminate the trouble of operational risk fundamentally, we have to insist on trying two systems and establish operational risk management system by putting people first, which integrates supervision with incentive and deterrence with warmth.