企业管理中委托代理问题的博弈均衡分析

本文运用博弈理论,根据信息是否对称分析了企业管理中完美信息和完全信息条件下委托—代理行为的均衡路径,以及在不同条件下委托方和代理方未来行为的各种可能性及其优化选择,认为信息不对称对委托—代理的影响很大,但追求信息的完全对称在实践中既不现实也不经济。企业所有者是否发生委托行为起决定作用的就是经营者的尽职程度,如果能够通过一定的制度设计,形成强大的社会监督和制度的约束机制,使所有者能够较为准确地得到经营者的信息,对于减少聘用过程中的不确定性也是有帮助的。

Game Models and Equilibrium Analysis on Principal-Agent Problem

The authors put forward that, with the help of game theory, the equili brium path about principal-agent problem is studied on the condition of perfect information, complete information and its asymmetry. Furthermore, the authorstry to find out the optimum choice and key equation for each side under pareto con ditions, meanwhile they draw out a conclusion that market mechanism imperfection and loss-of-credit will lead both sidesoff the correct path. The authors also points out that information asymmetry has great impact on principal-agent. And the perfect record of managers' credit and honesty and the encouragement of opera tors' devotion to their duties is the considerable solution to this problem.