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博弈视角下大学生互联网消费信贷决策行为研究
引用本文:彭小辉,王静怡,王坤沂.博弈视角下大学生互联网消费信贷决策行为研究[J].审计与经济研究,2020,35(1):120-126,F0003.
作者姓名:彭小辉  王静怡  王坤沂
作者单位:南京师范大学商学院,江苏南京210023;南京师范大学商学院,江苏南京210023;南京师范大学商学院,江苏南京210023
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71773076,71473165);江苏高校哲社重点项目(2017ZDIXM106)
摘    要:基于博弈论视角,从理论上构建了金融机构与大学生消费信贷决策的动态博弈模型,并引入信誉机制,比较分析了传统金融机构退出大学生信用卡市场而互联网金融大举进入校园信贷市场的深刻原因,同时借助大学生消费信贷调查一手数据实证检验了信誉机制的有效性,研究结果表明:在单次和有限次重复博弈中,“囚徒困境”普遍存在,而在无限次重复博弈中,尽管利率和交易成本下降有利于促进交易,但信息不对称问题却使博弈只能进行有限次,因此要达成长期合作,必须引入具有“社会性惩罚”的信誉机制来抑制大学生的短期投机行为,然信誉机制对于促进传统金融机构与大学生合作的作用有限,更多的是促进互联网金融机构与大学生消费信贷关系的达成,实证结果验证了该结论。由此得到的启示是,充分利用互联网大数据优势、强化互联网金融市场监管、引导大学生树立正确的消费观和责任意识,有助于破解“一放就乱,一管就死”的监管困局,这对于规范互联网金融校园消费信贷市场具有重要现实意义。

关 键 词:信誉机制  互联网金融  传统金融  消费信贷  博弈模型

Research on the internet credit consumptionbehavior of college students from the perspective of game theory
PENG Xiaohui,WANG Jingyi,WANG Kunyi.Research on the internet credit consumptionbehavior of college students from the perspective of game theory[J].Economy & Audit Study,2020,35(1):120-126,F0003.
Authors:PENG Xiaohui  WANG Jingyi  WANG Kunyi
Institution:(Business School,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023,China)
Abstract:Based on the perspective of game theory,this paper theoretically constructs a dynamic game model for the decisionmaking of consumer credit between financial institutions and college students,and introduces the credit mechanism,thus explaining the profound reasons why the traditional financial institutions withdraw from the college student credit card market and the Internet finance enters the campus market on a large scale,and empirically tests the Reputation mechanism with the help of the consumer credit survey data of college students.The results show that the“Prisoner's Dilemma”is common in single and finite repeated games.In the infinitely repeated game,although the decrease of interest rate and transaction cost is beneficial to promote the transaction,the problem of information asymmetry makes the game can only be carried out for a limited number of times.Therefore,in order to achieve long-term cooperation,the reputation mechanism with"social punishment"must be introduced to restrain the short-term speculation of college students,but the credit mechanism plays a limited role in promoting the cooperation between traditional financial institutions and college students,and more is to promote the cooperation between Internet finance institutions and college students’consumer credit.The empirical results also verify this conclusion.The resulting revelation,make full use of the Internet big data advantage,strengthening the Internet school financial market regulation,guide students to set up the correct consumption view and responsibility consciousness,establish a more efficient credit mechanism,thus crack the dilemma of“putting out the chaos and killing one tube”,to standardize financial campus Internet consumer credit market has important practical significance.
Keywords:reputation mechanism  internet finance  traditional financiel  consumption credit  game model
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