Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring |
| |
| Authors: | Elchanan Ben-Porath Michael Kahneman |
| |
| Institution: | aDepartment of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois, 60208;bDepartment of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel;cDepartment of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Israel |
| |
| Abstract: | The paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed. We address the following question: What is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes? The main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when the discount factor tends to one, contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at leasttwoother players.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C73. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
