Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? |
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Authors: | Walter Bossert Steven
J Brams D
Marc Kilgour |
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Institution: | a Département de Sciences Economiques and CRDE, Université de Montréal, CP 6128, Succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada;b Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA;c Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada |
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Abstract: | It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, over one round or n rounds. Representative solution concepts (Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium; two notions of core) are compared, and little agreement is found among them. Although it might be desirable to subsume these different solutions within a common framework, such unification seems unlikely since they are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability. |
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Keywords: | Truel Nash equilibrium Core |
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