| 监察变异条件下的煤矿安全监察行为进化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 付茂林,郭红玲.监察变异条件下的煤矿安全监察行为进化博弈分析[J].生态经济(学术版),2007(1). |
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| 作者姓名： | 付茂林 郭红玲 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南交通大学经管学院 成都610031(付茂林)，西南交通大学公共管理学院 成都610031(郭红玲) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文运用进化博弈理论建立了监察变异条件下的煤矿安全监察机构监察行为进化博弈模型,对监察行为的稳定状态进行了分析。研究表明:监察变异条件下的监察机构监察行为稳定状态主要与监察机构受贿金额、认真执行监察职能获得的激励、不认真执行监察职能节约的成本、上级领导监督概率、不执行监察职能所受处罚相关。最后,对上述参数对稳定点的影响进行了分析。
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| 关 键 词： | 安全监察 进化博弈 煤矿 贿赂 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Colliery Safe Supervision Behave Under Aberrated Condition |
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| FU Mao-lin,GUO Hong-lin.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Colliery Safe Supervision Behave Under Aberrated Condition[J].Ecological Economy,2007(1). |
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| Authors: | FU Mao-lin GUO Hong-lin |
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| Institution: | FU Mao-lin1,GUO Hong-lin2 |
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| Abstract: | By using evolutionary game,the model about the supervision behave of colliery safe organization under aberrated condition is set up,which is used to analysis the stable status of supervision behave.The result show that stable status is mainly related the sum of bribe,the encouragement gained by executing the supervision seriously,the cost saved by executing colliery safe supervision un-seriously,probability of leader's supervision and the lost of un-implementing the supervision function.At last,the influence on stable point affected by aforesaid parameters is given. |
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| Keywords: | safe supervision evolutionary game colliery bribe |
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