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基于EME-E范式的资产重组中股东利益均衡研究
引用本文:黄建欢,张亚斌,尹筑嘉.基于EME-E范式的资产重组中股东利益均衡研究[J].中国工业经济,2012(4):89-101.
作者姓名:黄建欢  张亚斌  尹筑嘉
作者单位:湖南大学经济与贸易学院;中国科学院系统科学研究所;长沙理工大学经济与管理学院
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目“大股东控制与上市公司治理均衡研究”(批准号10CGL039);教育部人文社会科学基金项目“整体上市的环境、模式与绩效研究”(批准号09YJA790064);教育部人文社会科学青年项目“基于流动性约束的大宗股权定价研究”(批准号09YJC90231);湖南省社会科学基金项目“市场创新、制度设计与风险防范”(批准号08YBA165)
摘    要:本文引入不含利益倾向性判断的"股东利益均衡"概念,提出均衡判断方法,并发展了一个"环境—模式—效率—股东利益均衡"(EME-E)的分析范式,考察资产重组中的股东利益分配问题。研究发现,整体上市这类大股东主导的重组现象在表面上是"支撑行为",但其重组效率为负,表明股东利益并不均衡,小股东的利益可能被侵占。该发现有助于解释大股东为何从消极的上市公司"救火队员"转向积极的"锦上添花"。进一步分析显示,一些模式和环境的重组绩效相对较差,与更严重的股东利益不均衡相联系,其形成机理在于大股东受到的监控和约束相对更宽松。本文认为,重组模式和环境的选择等内部治理机制有助于缓解但难以消除股东利益不均衡,尚需引入外部治理机制以有效制约大股东的机会主义行为,进行策略创新和制度创新以实现股东利益均衡。

关 键 词:资产重组  “环境—模式—效率—股东利益均衡”范式  投入产出效率  治理机制

The Equilibrium of Shareholders’ Benefits in the Asset Reorganization:Study Based on a New Paradigm of EME-E and the Cases of Holistic Listing
HUANG Jian-huan,ZHANG Ya-bin,YIN Zhu-jia.The Equilibrium of Shareholders’ Benefits in the Asset Reorganization:Study Based on a New Paradigm of EME-E and the Cases of Holistic Listing[J].China Industrial Economy,2012(4):89-101.
Authors:HUANG Jian-huan  ZHANG Ya-bin  YIN Zhu-jia
Institution:1.School of Economics and Trade of Hunan University,Changsha 410079,China; 2.Institute of Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100090,China; 3.Changsha University of Technology & Science,Changsha 410004,China)
Abstract:A new concept ‘equilibrium of shareholders’ benefits’ was put forward to analyze the corporate governance in the asset reorganization,without prejudgment on interests of shareholders’.And a new way was suggested to evaluate the equilibrium based on modes analysis and input-output efficiency with improved FA-DEA method.Then a new paradigm of EME-E(environment,mode,efficiency and equilibrium of shareholders’ benefits) was built and used to analyze corporate governance with the cases of holistic listing in China,a sort of big-scale asset reorganization leaded by controlling shareholders.The analysis of theory model shows:if the performance score is negative,controlling shareholders seize the benefits of minor shareholders.The empirical results show that:①Holistic listing produced negative influence,which means that there exists disequilibrium of shareholders benefits and the loss of minor shareholders’ benefits.Which helps us understand why large shareholders add a beautiful thing to a contrasting beautiful thing now instead of acting a role of fireman to listed companies.②Reorganizations performance in some modes and environment are relatively worse.The common point of them is that the supervision on controlling shareholders is relatively loose,which may be the important reason of worse disequilibrium of shareholders benefits.③Internal governance mechanism is not enough to solve the problem of disequilibrium.And external governance mechanism is necessary.At last the policy meaning on innovation of strategies and institutional is discussed to improve performance and realize equilibrium of shareholders benefits.
Keywords:asset reorganization  paradigm of environment  mode  efficiency and equilibrium of shareholders’ benefits(EME-E)  input-output efficiency  governance mechanism
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