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Corporate governance and the insolvency risk of financial institutions
Institution:1. University of Wollongong, School of Accounting Economics and Finance, Faculty of Business and Law, NSW 2522 Australia;2. University of Groningen, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business, Groningen, Netherlands;3. University of Vaasa, School of Accounting and Finance, P.O. Box 700, FI-65101 Vaasa, Finland;1. College of Business and Economics, California State University, East Bay, Hayward, CA 94588, USA;2. Department of Business, Penn State University Abington, Abington, PA 19001, USA;3. Federal Government of Brazil, Ministry of the Economy, Brazil;1. Ningbo Institute of Technology, Zhejiang University, Ningbo 315100, China;2. College of Business Administration, Hunan University, Changsha 410082, China;3. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 10081, China;1. Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, 170 Kessels Road, Nathan, QLD, 4111, Australia
Abstract:We investigate whether shareholder-friendliness of corporate governance mechanisms is related to the insolvency risk of financial institutions. Using a large sample of U.S. financial institutions over the period 2005–2010, we find that corporate governance is positively related to the insolvency risk of financial institutions as proxied by Merton’s distance to default measure and credit default swap (CDS) spread. We also find that “stronger” corporate governance increases insolvency risk relatively more for larger financial institutions and during the period of the financial crisis. Lastly, our results suggest that shareholder-friendliness of corporate governance mechanisms is viewed unfavorably in the bond market.
Keywords:Corporate governance  Insolvency risk  Bank risk-taking  Financial crisis  Financial institutions
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