Dividend payouts and catering to demands: Evidence from a dividend tax reform |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China;2. Business School, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China;3. Business School, Beijing Normal University, No. 19, Xinjiekouwai Street, Haidian, Beijing 100875, China;4. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China |
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| Abstract: | Utilizing the 2012 dividend tax reform in China, this paper examines how firms make dividend payout decisions that cater to the controlling shareholders' demand, especially when controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders have different dividend preferences. We find that firms increase dividend payouts when controlling shareholders demand higher dividends after the dividend tax reform. In particular, firms pay higher dividends when facing increased demand from controlling shareholders than when the demand is from minority investors. In addition, we find that firms that increase dividend payments due to the controlling shareholders' demand subsequently have more debt financing and poorer firm performance, suggesting that catering to the demands from controlling shareholders is subject to the Type II agency problem. |
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