| Abstract: | This article examines the nature and distribution of propertyrights in land and how they are changing under economic anddemographic pressures. It also analyzes the practical chancesof success of several alternative forms of policy interventionto redistribute property rights and regulate tenancy. This analysisbegins with the political economy of land reform in the twentiethcentury. It draws a distinction between reforms precipitatedby social upheaval (defeat in war, social revolution, or nationalliberation) and those that occur in "normal" times, when thesocial and political order is more secure. It is argued thatthe former have been much more important and, drawing on examples,that the latter face formidable obstacles. In this connection,it is proposed that a tax reform which does away with the highlyselective subsidies and exemptions that benefit the rich andinflate the price of land should be undertaken first. Then,when land prices have fallen, compulsory purchase of land forredistribution, at close to fair market value to ensure itspolitical acceptability, would not entail an intolerable fiscalburden. Where tenancy is concerned, it is argued that this institutionis commonly a socially useful market response, which providesopportunities for the fuller employment of family resourcesand, over the long run, for individual mobility. Thus interventionsdesigned to inhibit tenancy directly or to transfer ownership-likerights to existing tenants may result in heavy costs, especiallyfor future cohorts of would-be tenants. |
