风险投资家的最优激励契约模型研究--一种基于逆向选择和道德风险条件下的博弈模型分析

为减少风险投资融资中风险投资家的逆向选择和道德风险,风险投资者必须设立一套有效的激励机制来让风险投资家选择,从而根据风险投资家选择的结果来甄别其真实能力类型,同时又能激励其努力工作。文章建立了风险投资家能力类型和努力都是不可观测条件下的最优激励契约模型,并根据显示原理,利用最优控制理论求出了最优解进而进行了分析。得出的结论是:最优激励契约能使高能力风险投资家乐于选择具有高强度激励、低固定收入和风险小的项目,同时又能激励其签约后更加努力工作。

A Study on the Optimal Incentive Contract Model for Venture Capitalist--A Game Model under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

In order to resolve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems of venture capitalist during venture capital financing,venture investors must design a set of optimal incentive contract for venture capitalist to select,so as to judge their true information in terms of their selecting results and make them work hard.This paper sets up an optimal incentive contract model when both venture capitalist's ability genres and effort are unobservable.Following the revelation principle,we analyze and solve the model by applying the optimal controlling theory.Some conclusions educe that the optimal incentive contract makes venture capitalist of high ability prefer to choose the high powered incentive,lower fixed compensation and safer projects,and thereby make them work harder after signing contracts.