Can judicial efficiency improve territorial attractiveness to FDI? The Italian experience |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, U.S. Naval Academy, USA;2. FAME|GRAPE, ul. Mazowiecka 11/14, 00-052, Warsaw, Poland;1. University of Valencia, ERI-CES, Spain;2. Faculty of Economics, Avda. dels Tarongers, s/n, 46022, Valencia, Spain;1. University of Louisiana at Lafayette, USA;2. University of Arkansas at Little Rock, USA;1. Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Kolkata, India;2. Centre for Training and Research in Public Finance and Policy (CSSSC), Calcutta, India;3. CES–ifo, Munich, Germany;4. GEP, Nottingham, UK;5. National Law University, Delhi, India;6. Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India;1. Dept. of Mathematics, University of Bergen, Allégaten 41, Bergen, Vestland 5007, Norway;2. University of Rennes 1, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, F-35000, Rennes, France;3. Department of Political Sciences, University of Roma Tre, Via G. Chiabrera 199, 00145, Rome, Italy |
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| Abstract: | This paper explores the role that judicial efficiency may play as a determinant of inward FDI at sub-national level. Italy is an ideal case to deal with this still unexplored issue since the same law apply in all the national territory, but the degree of law enforcement varies considerably across different courts. We found that judicial efficiency affects positively FDI inflows. This result, though heterogeneous across different economic sectors, is robust to different specifications and sample selections. Our results have interesting policy implications, since they highlight the importance of non-targeted FDI policies as factors driving inward flows. |
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| Keywords: | Foreign direct investment Institutions Judicial efficiency F23 K4 H73 |
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