Unemployment insurance and involuntary unemployment: The case of adverse selection |
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| Authors: | Stephen R. G. Jones |
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| Affiliation: | 1. USDA ARS, Hydrology and Remote Sensing Laboratory, Beltsville, MD, USA;2. School of Natural Resources, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, NE, USA;3. Marshall Space Flight Center, Earth Science Branch, Huntsville, AL, USA;4. Space Science and Engineering Center, Cooperative Institute for Meteorological Satellite Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
This paper studies the private and public provision of unemployment insurance in a model where equilibrium unemployment results from the use of the wage as a worker selection device. It is shown that private provision will not occur, essentially because those workers most desired by a firm place least value on such coverage. Respecting the same informational constraints, public provision necessarily gives rise to some distortions in participation decisions, but nonetheless is welfare improving in the aggregate. |
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