我国知识产权保护中的企业与政府行为分析

文章以知识产权得到有效保护时计算机软件的价格和产量为比较标准,分析了我国知识产权保护中的企业与政府行为及其后果。文章得出结论认为:与知识产权完全实施时相比较,侵犯知识产权的行为不仅降低了国内类型软件产量,提高国内软件的价格,而且也降低了国外软件开发商在中国市场的利润,而这正是发达国家与我国在与贸易相关的知识产权问题上存在摩擦的主要原因。从短期静态利益考虑,地方政府在追求社会福利最大化时,零查处概率是最佳选择。政府查处盗版的最优概率是查处侵犯知识产权的边际收益等于边际成本时的概率,盗版现象虽不可能被完全杜绝,但却可以被控制在一定的范围和程度内。

The Enterprise and Government Behaviors in Intellectual Property Right Protection of Our Country

Using the price and output of computer software as a comparing standard when intellectual property rights are effectively protected,we analyze the enterprise and government behaviors and their consequence in China's intellectual property rights protection.We come to the conclusion that the behavior of violating intellectual property rights not only reduces the output of China's software,raises its price,but also reduces China's software developer's profit in China's market.This is just the main reason why developed countries and our country have friction in the problem of intellectual property right about trade.Thinking about short static interest,zero rate of investigation is the best choice when the government pursues to maximize social welfare.The optimum rate of the pirate investigation of the government is the rate in which they investigate the infringement of the intellectual property rights while the marginal revenue equals to marginal cost.Therefore,it is impossible to stop the pirate phenomenon completely,but it can be controlled to a certain extent and level.