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证券投资基金持股与管理者过度投资行为的相关性研究
引用本文:张继德,王静.证券投资基金持股与管理者过度投资行为的相关性研究[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2012,26(3):10-18.
作者姓名:张继德  王静
作者单位:北京工商大学商学院,北京100048;东北财经大学博士后流动站,辽宁大连116025
基金项目:国家社会科学基金青年项目,北京市教委"科研基地-科技创新平台-会计与投资者保护研究基地"项目,北京市教委社科计划重点项目
摘    要:基于沪深A股上市公司2008年-2010年的研究数据,分析了证券投资基金持股对企业过度投资的影响。研究发现,证券投资基金持股比例与管理者过度投资显著负相关,证券投资基金能有效抑制管理者的过度投资行为;进一步研究发现,证券投资基金持股比例越高,上市公司派发现金股利水平越高,并且证券投资基金持股在一定程度上能够抑制上市公司恶意派现的现象。

关 键 词:证券投资基金  过度投资  现金股利  恶意派现

Correlation Research on the Securities Investment Funds Holding and Managers' Over-investment Behavior
ZHANG Ji-de , WANG Jing.Correlation Research on the Securities Investment Funds Holding and Managers' Over-investment Behavior[J].Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce,2012,26(3):10-18.
Authors:ZHANG Ji-de  WANG Jing
Institution:1(1.Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China; 2.Post-doctoral Station,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian Liaoning 116025,China)
Abstract:Based on the research data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange from 2008 to 2010,the paper analyzes the influence of the shareholding ratio of securities investment funds on managers’ over-investment behavior.It is found that the shareholding ratio of securities investment funds has a significant negative correlation with managers’ over-investment behavior,which implies that the securities investment funds play a significant role in inhibiting managers’ over-investment behavior.Further research shows that the increase of shareholding ratio of securities investment funds improves the company cash dividend level and suppresses the malicious cash dividend level to some extent.
Keywords:the securities investment funds  over-investment  cash dividend  malicious cash dividend
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