土地发展权博弈视角下高铁站区开发权及开发利益分配

世界上作为城市综合体的高铁站区都依托于权责利益明确的土地开发,但我国大多数高铁站综合开发收效甚微。在分析中国高铁站区开发土地发展权的内涵及其权利归属现状的基础上,认为产生上述差异的原因在于高铁站区的土地发展权归属不同。在此基础上,以高铁站区土地为核心,以铁路主体为桥梁,对铁路主体与政府之间的土地发展权归属问题进行了不完全信息下的动态博弈分析,以寻求土地发展权归属的最优策略。结论如下:在地方政府选择让渡、铁路主体选择服从、铁路主体与市场主体形成综合开发联盟并通过铁路主体的最终开发活动实现博弈均衡时,各方获得最大收益。

HSR Station Area Development Interest DistributionBased on Land Property Rights Game Theory

The high-speed railway(HSR) station in the world as a city complex relies on land development with clear rights and interests,but the comprehensive development of most HSR stations in China has achieved little success.On the basis of analyzing the connotation of land development right of HSR station and its benefit distribution,this paper considers that the reason is that the land development right of HSR station area is different.It regards high-speed rail station land as the core,the HSR as the intermediary,and analyzes the incomplete information dynamic game of land development rights between the railway and the government by using the method of land property rights theory in order to seek the optimal strategy of land development rights attribution.And it establishes a double game framework while taking the railway as the intermediary between the railway rail and the government,the government and the market's.An important conclusion is that,while the local government chooses assignment,and railway choose to obey,and the railway and the market form a comprehensive development alliance,and achieve balanced development activities through the railway,the parties maximize returns.