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对金融监管腐败的制度约束与博弈分析
引用本文:戴新华,张强.对金融监管腐败的制度约束与博弈分析[J].上海金融学院学报,2006(4):18-22.
作者姓名:戴新华  张强
作者单位:湖南大学金融学院,湖南,长沙,410079
摘    要:如何积极有效地防范金融监管腐败是当前一个重大课题。本文分析了金融监管腐败形成的必要条件,探讨了防范金融监管腐败的制度约束办法,并建立一个博弈模型,讨论了金融监管反腐各个因素之间的关系。结果表明,要有效防范金融监管腐败,反腐机构要在查办和惩罚两个方面加大力度,强化金融监管部门业务经费的透明度管理,重点打击中小案件,既要事前重成慑,也要事后抓惩治,降低腐败的期望效益。

关 键 词:监管腐败  制度约束  博弈
文章编号:1673-680X(2006)04-0018-05
收稿时间:2006-06-09
修稿时间:2006年6月9日

Institutional Restriction of the Financial Supervisory Corruption and the Gaming Analysis
DAI Xinhua,ZHANG Qiang.Institutional Restriction of the Financial Supervisory Corruption and the Gaming Analysis[J].Journal of Shanhai Finance University,2006(4):18-22.
Authors:DAI Xinhua  ZHANG Qiang
Abstract:It is a significant topic as to how to prevent financial regulation corruption effectively.This paper analyses the essential condition of the formation of financial regulation corruption and discusses the institutional restraint measures to prevent financial regulation corruption. Then a game model is raised to discuss the relationship amongst the factors which are applied to prevent corruption.The conclusion is that in order to prevent financial regulation corruption effectively, we should reinforce the anti-corruption task from the respect of investigation and punishment, and implement the transparent budget management of financial supervisory organizations. The focal point is the small and average cases. The pre-warning and post-punishment are both necessary as to bring down the expected benefit of corruption.
Keywords:supervisory corruption  institutional restriction  game playing
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