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基于声誉效应的工程监理激励机制模型研究
引用本文:余晓蓝,毛红日. 基于声誉效应的工程监理激励机制模型研究[J]. 工程经济, 2020, 0(2): 32-37
作者姓名:余晓蓝  毛红日
作者单位:长沙理工大学
摘    要:为了提高工程监理工作积极性,基于Holmstrom-Milgrom模型,引入声誉效应,建立声誉效应和显性激励机制相结合的动态委托代理激励模型.分析声誉效应发挥激励机制作用条件,并与未考虑声誉效应的委托代理模型进行比较.结果表明:声誉效应在满足一定的条件下,引入声誉激励机制能够增加业主的期望收益,并且能提高监理的努力水平...

关 键 词:委托代理  信息不对称  激励机制  声誉效应  数值模拟

Research on Supervision Incentive Mechanism Model Based on Reputation
YU Xiaolan,Mao Hongri. Research on Supervision Incentive Mechanism Model Based on Reputation[J]. Engineering Economy, 2020, 0(2): 32-37
Authors:YU Xiaolan  Mao Hongri
Affiliation:(Changsha University of Science and Technology,Changsha 410114,China)
Abstract:In order to improve the enthusiasm of project supervision,this paper introduces reputation effect based on Holmstrom-Milgrom model to establish a dynamic principal-agent incentive model combining reputation effect and explicit incentive mechanism.Then,analyzes the conditions under which reputation effect can play the role of incentive mechanism,and compares it with the principal-agent model without considering reputation effect.The results show that under certain conditions,the introduction of reputation incentive mechanism can increase the expected return of owners and improve the level of supervision efforts.Finally,verifies the rationality of introducing reputation effect by numerical simulation.
Keywords:principle-agent  information asymmetry  incentive mechanism  reputation effect  numerical simulation
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