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信息不对称前提下银行信贷活动的博弈分析
引用本文:毛锦,蔡淑琴.信息不对称前提下银行信贷活动的博弈分析[J].经济经纬,2006,12(5):138-141.
作者姓名:毛锦  蔡淑琴
作者单位:华中科技大学,湖北,武汉,430074
摘    要:笔者以众多经济学家对信用经济学的研究成果为基础,把银行信贷活动中交易双方的行为选择作为研究对象,将信息不对称本身作为研究的前提条件,并通过建立博弈模型及求解,分析了银行信贷交易的机理以及“逆行选择”、“道德风险”等相关因素对于交易双方的策略影响,并在此研究的基础上,提出改善和削减信息不对称对信贷交易活动影响的几点对策和建议。

关 键 词:信息不对称  诚信表述  信贷监管  逆向选择  道德风险
文章编号:1006-1096(2006)05-0138-04
收稿时间:2006-05-07
修稿时间:2006年5月7日

Game Analysis of Bank Credit Activity on the Premise of Information Dissymmetry
MAO Jin,CAI Shu-qin.Game Analysis of Bank Credit Activity on the Premise of Information Dissymmetry[J].Economic Survey,2006,12(5):138-141.
Authors:MAO Jin  CAI Shu-qin
Institution:Httazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China
Abstract:Based on many economists' research results on credit economics,this paper uses the behavior choices of transaction parties in the bank credit activities as a research object and uses information dissymmetry itself as a research premise to solve and analyze the mechanism of credit transaction and the influence of related factors such as converse choices,moral risks on two parties' strategies by establishing game models.On the basis of that,the author puts forwards some counter-measures for improving and reducing the influence of information dissymmetry on credit transaction activities.
Keywords:information dissymmetry  trust expression  credit supervision  converse choice  moral risk
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