Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information |
| |
| Authors: | Roberto Serrano Oved Yosha |
| |
| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Brown University, 02912 Providence, RI, USA;(2) The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, 69978 Tel-Aviv, Israel;(3) Department of Economics, Brown University, 02912 Providence, RI, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | Summary We study the welfare properties of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information, establishing an equivalence between asymptotically expost individually rational and asymptotically (ex-ante, interim and ex-post) efficient equilibrium sequences.We thank Andreu Mas-Colell, Eric Maskin, and Thomas Sjöström for having raised the question which led to the writing of this paper. We are grateful to Nicholas Yannelis and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
