Est in aqua dulci non invidiosa voluptas In pure water there is a pleasure begrudged by none: on ownership,accountability and control in a privatized utility |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Internal Medicine and Paediatrics, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Buea, Buea, Cameroon;2. Health and Human Development (2HD) Research Network, Douala, Cameroon;3. Department of Internal Medicine, Douala General Hospital, Douala, Cameroon;4. Biochemistry Unit, Douala General Hospital Laboratory, Douala, Cameroon;5. Department of Biomedical Sciences, Faculty of Medicine and Pharmaceutical Sciences, University of Douala, Douala, Cameroon;6. Faculty of Epidemiology and Population Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom;7. National Obesity Centre, Yaounde Central Hospital, Yaounde, Cameroon;8. Department of Internal Medicine and Subspecialties, Faculty of Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, University of Yaounde 1, Yaounde, Cameroon;9. South African Medical Research Council, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa;2. Cleveland Clinic, Department of Endocrinology, Diabetes & Metabolism, 9500 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44195, USA;3. Addis Ababa University, Endocrine Unit, PO Box 9086, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia |
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| Abstract: | We explore the proposition that the unitary board structure is defective, as a mechanism of effective corporate governance, in its application in the post-privatization British water industry. Specifically we explore the case of Yorkshire Water plc and a serious crisis that it faced as a result of a severe drought in the summer of 1995. Our contention is that whilst the water company continued to meet its commitment to raising shareholder value, it failed to meet the needs of other stakeholders, and not least its customers. Our analysis of this case is grounded in a discussion of the political-economy and critical accounting literatures relating to private versus public provision and privatization. Following this we outline the nature of governance by unitary board and then turn to Yorkshire Water’s crisis, its failure in service provision and its performance. Based upon this we then lay out the precursors to the crisis and review the role that the unitary board model played in its development. We conclude by proposing that the dual board model may be better suited to the management of the production of essential “public" goods, in order to protect the interests of all stakeholders. |
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