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Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance
Authors:Christopher Clague  Philip Keefer  Stephen Knack  Mancur Olson
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, San Diego State University, USA;(2) Development Research Group, World Bank, USA;(3) IRIS, University of Maryland, USA;(4) IRIS and Department of Economics, University of Maryland at, College Park
Abstract:
We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called ldquocontract-intensive moneyrdquo or CIM, is based on citizensrsquo decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.
Keywords:contract enforcement  property rights  governance  economic growth
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