Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance |
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Authors: | Christopher Clague Philip Keefer Stephen Knack Mancur Olson |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, San Diego State University, USA;(2) Development Research Group, World Bank, USA;(3) IRIS, University of Maryland, USA;(4) IRIS and Department of Economics, University of Maryland at, College Park |
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Abstract: | ![]() We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called contract-intensive money or CIM, is based on citizens decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy. |
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Keywords: | contract enforcement property rights governance economic growth |
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