Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion |
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Authors: | Christian Schultz |
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Institution: | a Centre for Industrial Economics, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, Copenhagen K 1455, Denmark b EPRU, Copenhagen, Denmark c CES-ifo, Munich, Germany |
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Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion. |
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Keywords: | L13 L40 |
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