Ill‐Defined versus Precise Pre‐Play Communication in the Traveler's Dilemma |
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Authors: | Sujoy Chakravarty Emmanuel Dechenaux Jaideep Roy |
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Institution: | 1. Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, School of Social Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 110067, India.;2. Department of Economics, Kent State University, Kent, OH 44242, USA.;3. Department of Economics, JG Smith Building, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK. |
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Abstract: | This article reports results from an experiment comparing the effects of vague versus precise pre‐play communication in a highly competitive two‐player game with conflicting interests. In the classic Traveler's Dilemma, non‐binding precise messages about intent of play are pure cheap talk. We conjecture that a form of imprecise pre‐play communication whereby subjects can submit ill‐defined messages may help foster cooperation because of their vagueness. Comparing behavior both across modes of communication and to a baseline case without communication, we find that cooperation is highest when players can communicate using precise numerical messages. When communication with ill‐defined messages is allowed, then conditional on receiving a message, subjects act more cooperatively than when no message is received. However, overall, the ability to exchange ill‐defined messages does not substantially improve cooperation. |
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