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对经理人激励理论与实践的重新思考
引用本文:毕茜,刘娜. 对经理人激励理论与实践的重新思考[J]. 现代财经, 2007, 27(8): 41-44
作者姓名:毕茜  刘娜
作者单位:西南大学,经济管理学院,重庆400716
摘    要:经理人激励实践起源于英国,20世纪初在欧洲成为一种惯例,最近20年在美国大行其道,但以股票期权为主要表现形式的经理人激励却诱导和加重了盈余操纵.而在我国,随着企业经理人激励的逐渐盛行以及制度上对它的允许和保证,经理人激励将会成为普遍性的实践.在界定相关概念的基础上,介绍了对经理人激励的理论支持,并对经理人激励提出质疑,最后得出自己的结论.

关 键 词:经理人  经理人激励  盈余操纵
文章编号:1005-1007(2007)08-0041-04
收稿时间:2006-12-29
修稿时间:2006-12-29

Rethinking of Theory and Practice of Executive Incentive
Bi Qian,Liu Na. Rethinking of Theory and Practice of Executive Incentive[J]. Modern Finance and Economics(Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics), 2007, 27(8): 41-44
Authors:Bi Qian  Liu Na
Abstract:The practice of executive incentives origins from England, and becomes a convention at the beginning of 20th century. It is becoming more and more popular in American in the last twenty years. However, executive incentives, which are mostly represented by stock options, induce and aggravate earnings manipulation. In China, since more and more corporations begin to accept the practice of executive incentives, and institutions also guarantee it, it will become a universal practice. In this article, we will define some correlated notions, then, introduce the main arguments for the executive incentives. After challenging the executive incentives, we gain our conclusions.
Keywords:Executive    Executive Incentive    Earnings Manipulation
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