| 基于大股东掏空下的经理人薪酬激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘善敏,林斌.基于大股东掏空下的经理人薪酬激励机制研究[J].财经研究,2011(8). |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘善敏 林斌 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南师范大学经济与管理学院;中山大学管理学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学青年资助项目(10YJCZH113) |
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| 摘 要： | 大股东的存在加强了对经理人的监督,但存在大股东掏空时经理人会与大股东谈判以降低其业绩标准,从而削弱经理人的薪酬激励监督。文章将大股东掏空与经理人薪酬激励纳入同一分析框架,探讨两者的相互作用。研究发现,大股东掏空降低了经理人的业绩薪酬激励强度,并且实际控制人性质也影响这种激励强度。文章的研究为更全面地了解大股东的作用和两类代理成本的相互影响提供了参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 掏空 资金占用 业绩薪酬敏感性 激励强度 |
Study on Incentive Mechanism of Executive Compensation Based on Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders |
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| LIU Shan-min,LIN bin.Study on Incentive Mechanism of Executive Compensation Based on Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2011(8). |
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| Authors: | LIU Shan-min LIN bin |
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| Institution: | LIU Shan-min1,2,LIN bin2(1.School of Economics and Management,South China Normal University,Guangzhou 510006,China,2.School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China) |
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| Abstract: | The existence of major shareholders strengthens the supervision of managers,but if there is tunneling behavior of major shareholders,managers will negotiate with major shareholders in order to reduce their performance standards,thereby weakening the pay incentive supervision of managers.This paper incorporates tunneling behavior of major shareholders and executive compensation incentives into an analytical framework and discusses the interaction.It finds that tunneling behavior of major shareholders results... |
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| Keywords: | tunneling capital occupation pay-performance sensitivity incentive intensity |
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