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The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly
Authors:Ezra Einy   Diego Moreno  Benyamin Shitovitz
Affiliation:a Department of Economics, Ben Gurion University, PO BOX 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel;b Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903, Getafe, Spain;c Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel
Abstract:We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
Keywords:JEL classification codes: C72   D43   L13
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