容错机制能促进国有企业创新吗

如何提高国有企业的创新能力是一个富有争议的问题。本文以近年来国有企业实施的容错机制为切入点研究国有企业创新问题，通过构建动态博弈模型并求解纳什均衡提出了两个理论假说：（1）正向激励可以提高国企高管的低风险创新激励，但不能提高其高风险创新激励；（2）正向激励和容错机制的结合可以提高国企高管的高风险创新激励。本文以中央企业建立容错机制为准自然实验，基于2013—2019年央企实际控制的上市公司数据，使用多期双重差分法验证了上述假说。进一步研究发现，容错机制对竞争性行业和高管年轻化的国有企业的高风险创新具有更加明显的促进作用。本文的发现为提升国有企业创新能力提供了一个新的视角，也为优化国有企业容错机制提供了依据。

CAN FAULT-TOLERANT MECHANISM PROMOTE THE INNOVATION OF SOES

How to improve the innovation ability of state owned enterprises is a controversial issueBased on the fault tolerant mechanism implemented by state owned enterprises，this paper studies the innovation of state owned enterprisesBy constructing a dynamic game model and solving the Nash equilibrium，this paper puts forward two theoretical hypotheses：（1） positive incentive can improve the low risk innovation incentive of SOE executives，but cannot improve their high risk innovation incentive；（2） the combination of positive incentive and fault tolerant mechanism can promote the high risk innovation incentive of SOE executivesEmpirically，taking the establishment of fault tolerant mechanism implemented by central enterprises as a quasi natural experiment，this paper uses the data of listed companies actually controlled by central enterprises from 2013 to 2019 and adopts multi period DID method to verify the above hypothesisFurther research shows that when an enterprise is in a competitive industry or its executives are younger，the promotion effect of fault tolerance mechanism on high risk innovation investment is strongerThe findings not only provide a new perspective for improving the innovation ability of SOEs，but also provide a basis for optimizing their fault tolerant mechanism