上市公司独立审计制度的博弈分析

注册会计师审计是治理财务舞弊一种不可或缺的外部监控机制,在我国现有注册会计师独立审计聘用制度下是否有效,仍有待检验。本文运用博弈论的方法通过建立模型,揭示了在我国上市公司内部人控制较严重的背景下,由上市公司选择会计师事务所容易导致注册会计师的独立性缺失,难以发挥注册会计师审计应有的作用;如果改由证监会选聘注册会计师,将更有利于注册会计师审计制度职能的实现。

A Game Theoretic Analysis of the CPA System in Listed Companies

the CPA auditing is an important external supervising mechanism of governing the financial fraud, and is it effective under our present CPA independent auditing employee system? In this paper, models are set up on the basis of Game theory to analyze the CPA system's efficiency, and draw the following conclusion that the CPA system is inefficient in China because of its serious internal corporate control and the fact that CPA offices are selected by the listed companies, whereas the situation may be improved if the CPA offices are appointed by CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission).